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The Top Hatters also contend that the City of Gilroy is liable under Monell for violating
their First Amendment rights by enforcing the GGFA dress code. But it is generally not a
constitutional violation for a police officer to enforce a private entity’s rights. As the
district judge noted in this case, and we agree, if the ability ‘to exclude others from public
property during the course of a limited, permitted use’ were found to be a constitutional
violation, ‘[e]very picnic, wedding, company outing, meeting, rally, and fair held on
public grounds would be subject to constitutional scrutiny.’ Because there is no
constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability.
But even if there were a constitutional violation, the Top Hatters cannot establish
municipal liability under the Monell standard. In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a
local government may indeed be liable for violation of constitutional rights resulting from
‘a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated
by that body's officers’ or ‘pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom
has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.’
Generally, a municipality is liable under Monell only if a municipal policy or custom was
the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation. In other words, there must be ‘a
direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.’ Furthermore, it is not enough to ‘merely [to] alleg[e] that the
existing...program...represents a policy for which the city is responsible.’
Here, the Top Hatters point to the fact that the permit requires that the City’s police
provide a portion of the Festival’s security, that the City is reimbursed for providing such
security, and that Officer Bergman complied with the request of the GGFA’s chair of
security to remove individuals who did not comply with GGFA’s dress code. None of
these facts gives rise to the conclusion that the City had a policy or custom of enforcing
GGFA’s dress code. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record of a custom or
official policy of the City to enforce the GGFA’s dress code, nor is there evidence that
Gilroy officials participated in forming the dress code.
Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2008), citations omitted.
Reviewing the circumstances, this court is convinced that Villegas must be distinguished from
the case at hand for a number of reasons.
First, the en banc majority opinion did not deal with the actions of Officer Bergman and
whether they gave rise to liability for Gilroy. The opinion dealt exclusively with the issue of
whether GGFA’s acts constituted state action and whether Monell liability flowed from that. In
this case, Brenden is not being sued and the acts under consideration are those of Modesto
employees acting in their official capacities. The district court in Villegas found that 1) Officer
Bergman’s actions constituted state action, 2) Monell liability likely applied to Gilroy, 3) GGFA
was not a state actor, and 4) Plaintiffs’ clothing was not expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment. See Villegas v. City of Gilroy, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (N.D. Cal. 2005). The
original district court opinion also states that “Plaintiffs’ Complaint also names Officer D.
Case 1:08-cv-01061-AWI -SMS Document 43 Filed 11/19/08 Page 17 of 22